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South Africa's African National Congress: Weathering Challenges [REDACTED]

A Research Paper

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South Africa's African National Congress: Weathering Challenges [REDACTED]

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [REDACTED] of the
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**South Africa's
African National Congress:
Weathering Challenges** [REDACTED]

Summary

*Information available
as of 3 March 1988
was used in this report.*

The African National Congress (ANC) has met the challenges posed by turbulent events in South Africa over the last few years by maintaining its organizational cohesion, retaining its dominant position in the antiapartheid movement, and broadening its contacts with the West. Pretoria's virtual banning of the black opposition in February probably will lead to new challenges and opportunities for the ANC, particularly in its relations with groups inside South Africa. [REDACTED]

The leadership component of the ANC—the 27-member National Executive Committee—has rigorously adhered to consensus decisionmaking to reconcile ideological, generational, and ethnic differences. The organization also has avoided fractious debate by focusing on its goal—the overthrow of white rule in Pretoria—while skirting controversial issues such as the character of a postapartheid South Africa. [REDACTED]

The ANC's ability to forge consensus has enabled it to adjust its political and military policies to address the changing realities of South Africa. The increased radicalization and politicization of blacks during the last several years and the emergence of strong antigovernment domestic organizations, such as the United Democratic Front, have posed new challenges to the exiled ANC's policies and to its ability to affect developments in the black community. The ANC has responded by relaxing restrictions on targets for its insurgents and establishing alliances with internal groups, including the increasingly powerful black labor movement, to avoid a competition for black loyalties and to secure recognition of its own preeminent role. To widen its base—and erode support for South African State President Botha's regime—the ANC has also intensified its campaign to woo South African whites. [REDACTED]

The ANC has taken advantage of the unparalleled interest in South Africa on the part of foreign governments to attempt to increase international pressure on Pretoria and to seek political and financial backers. ANC officials reportedly consider Western pressure—particularly in the form of sanctions—and international isolation crucial to breaking Pretoria's will. Pretoria's recent crackdown on internal opponents probably will give new impetus to the ANC's campaign for stiffer economic sanctions against South Africa. Overtures to the West have not substituted for longstanding ties to the Soviet Union, however; the organization has simply widened the range of its international contacts. [REDACTED]

We believe that the ANC's successful response to recent challenges indicates that it will continue to maintain organizational unity and policy relevance under probable conditions over the near term. We doubt that the organization will make any dramatic policy changes in the next two to three years, but the question of killing South African whites will remain a controversial topic. We believe that ANC leaders will be reluctant to endorse a wholesale campaign directed at white civilians, but operational constraints will probably preclude tight control over more militant ANC members. In addition, militant youths—further radicalized by the latest wave of government restrictions—may call for an increase in attacks on civilian targets. As a result, we foresee a continued slow increase in white casualties. [REDACTED]

The ANC's reliance on consensus decisionmaking also makes it less likely that the group will adopt any bold initiatives. We believe that ANC leaders will continue to find it easier to agree internally on responses to government actions than on new strategies of their own. Moreover, unity concerns, which preclude debate of contentious issues, and the continued need for Soviet aid suggest that the strong Communist influence will not diminish. [REDACTED]

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Although unlikely to occur over the near term, developments that would threaten ANC cohesion include leadership infighting—perhaps as the result of the release of Nelson Mandela—or an increase in black ethnic tensions. Moreover, we believe that, should the ANC come to power, the organization's ideological, generational, and ethnic differences would significantly worsen and threaten the group's cohesion. If Pretoria significantly increased violent internal repression and if the ANC were challenged by more militant groups that advocated a radical military policy directed at whites, in our view, the ANC could embrace a violent campaign against white civilians. On the other hand, if Pretoria agreed to credible power-sharing negotiations with important opposition groups representing significant numbers of blacks, the ANC might decide to abandon its preconditions for negotiations in order not to be excluded from a political settlement. [REDACTED]

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
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Scope Note

This paper assesses the continued viability of the exiled African National Congress (ANC) as the leader of the antiapartheid struggle in the wake of developments in South Africa since 1984. It goes beyond two previous studies¹ in discussing how the organization copes with internal tensions and responds to challenges to its leadership posed by black opposition groups inside South Africa and by intense international scrutiny. [REDACTED]



Figure 1
African National Congress (ANC) Headquarters in Southern Africa and the Frontline States



South Africa's African National Congress: Weathering Challenges [REDACTED]

Introduction

Unrest erupted anew in South Africa in 1984 when a revised Constitution gave limited national political representation to Coloreds and Indians but continued to deny the same rights to blacks. The extent and intensity of black reaction produced government countermeasures that ranged from half-hearted attempts at political reform to the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency in June 1986, and, more recently, the virtual banning of 17 opposition groups and a trade union federation. The period since 1984 also has seen the emergence of black political organizations and leaders inside South Africa, a growth in militancy among black youth, and mushrooming international pressure on Pretoria to make meaningful political changes. These new realities have had a profound impact not only on the white regime in Pretoria but also on its principal opponent, the African National Congress (ANC). [REDACTED]

This Research Paper examines the ANC's response to unprecedented organizational and policy challenges since 1984, discusses prospects for continued ANC cohesion and leadership of the antiapartheid struggle over the near term, and examines policy implications for the United States. It also explores alternative developments that might precipitate a split in the organization or cause dramatic shifts in ANC policies. [REDACTED]

Organizational Challenges: Maintaining Cohesion

The African National Congress has contended with ideological, generational, and ethnic factionalism since it was founded in 1912. Tensions among groups have varied in intensity and scope, regularly prompting changes in policy and tactics and on rare occasions causing open splits in the organization. Profound differences over strategy during the late 1940s enabled Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and other leading lights in the ANC Youth League to seize

control of the parent organization. In 1959, ideological and ethnic disagreements led dissidents to form the splinter Pan-Africanist Congress. Internal ANC differences have also been responsible for the occasional purging of individual officials and of small cliques that refused to assent to the majority view. Despite a plethora of new internal and external pressures that have intensified in recent years, the ANC has survived intact largely because the organization's disparate groups have subordinated their individual agendas in pursuit of their common goal—the overthrow of the white regime. [REDACTED]

Handling Fissures

Ideological Differences. Ideological frictions primarily revolve around the inclusion of Communists in the ANC and have long been the most serious leadership and organizational problem facing the ANC. The political views of members of the National Executive Committee (NEC), the primary leadership component of the ANC, range from moderate socialist to hard-line Marxist. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The National Executive Committee

As the policymaking arm of the ANC, the NEC effectively runs the ANC through its committees, whose everyday responsibilities include administration and foreign, political, and military affairs. The 27 members of the NEC represent, although unevenly, the ideological, age, and ethnic groups that the ANC comprises and also embody the deep differences in views that characterize those groups:^a

- *Generationally, 19 NEC members belong to the group that began associating with the ANC before it was outlawed in 1960 and turned to violence. The youngest members of this group are in their early fifties. Eight NEC members belong to the next generation, which encompasses those who became active in the ANC during the decade following the 1960 massacre of black protesters at Sharpeville. Representatives from this generation are in their midthirties to late forties. Younger, more militant generations are not yet represented on the NEC.*
- *Ethnically, the NEC has 22 blacks from five different tribes, two Indians, two Coloreds, and one white.*

The ideological and generational affiliations of the NEC inadequately reflect the makeup of the ANC itself. Our analysis of intelligence reporting leads us to conclude that the percentage of Communists on the NEC is considerably higher than the overall percentage in the ANC, for example, and the median age of the NEC is probably about 20 years older than that of organization members as a whole. On the other hand, we believe the NEC's ethnic composition faithfully mirrors the black majority in the ANC and Xhosa preeminence among black groups.

^a See appendix B for details regarding the affiliations of NEC members.



Figure 2. ANC and SACP officials celebrating the SACP's 65th anniversary.

Sechaba ©

Although ideological differences pose the greatest potential threat to ANC unity, both non-Communists and Communists have deliberately subordinated long-term partisan goals in recognition of the mutual benefits of working together to achieve their common short-term objective. The public comments of SACP members, many of whom historically have taken their directions from Moscow, suggest that the party believes that the promotion of ANC unity is the best way to maintain SACP influence over the course of events leading to eventual black rule in South Africa.

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Moreover, partnership probably appears more attractive to the SACP than competition because the party has organizational problems that mirror the ideological, generational, and ethnic differences of the ANC as a whole. [redacted] younger SACP members exhibit a stronger nationalist streak and a weaker ideological commitment than most of the older members.

[redacted]. The recent Soviet focus on a political rather than a military solution to South Africa's problems (probably fostered by Moscow's realization that the "revolution" is not imminent), as well as Soviet acknowledgment of the ANC's primacy in the antiapartheid struggle, also encourages SACP cooperation with non-Communists and helps to alleviate ideological tensions between them, at least for the short term. [redacted]

Non-Communists in the ANC are equally anxious to keep ideological frictions to a minimum. To preserve unity, Tambo traditionally has responded to SACP complaints about anti-Communist machinations by curbing the party's antagonists. [redacted]

Generational Tensions. Generational differences in the ANC have a long history but have particularly plagued the organization since the outbreak of the 1976 Soweto riots, which brought a massive influx of militant young recruits into ANC ranks. The last few years have seen the emergence inside South Africa of a new group of committed and even more radicalized black youth, who have joined ANC militants in urging an intensified military campaign. [redacted]

These demands have placed increasing strains on the organization. Middle-aged and older members still dominate the leadership—they fill almost all senior



Figure 3. Young blacks showing their support for the Freedom Charter, which embodies the ANC's primary goals. (U)

posts, including all NEC seats—but younger cadres, [redacted] probably comprise more than 75 percent of the rank and file in the ANC itself and its military wing. The key issue has been their divergent approach to violence and military tactics. The younger members not only support these means but also tend to be more distrustful of whites and less committed to particular economic systems. [redacted]

In the last couple of years, the ANC leadership has adjusted its policies both in response to the demands of its younger generation and because even more senior ANC officials became convinced of the need to modify their military tactics. The election of several relatively junior officials to NEC seats in 1985 probably also pleased the militants. The public statements of these new NEC members—although they are in their forties and therefore do not belong to the same generation as the militants—suggest that they identify more closely with the aspirations of young cadres than the more senior leaders. [redacted]

Race and Ethnicity. Race is the least fractious and most often exaggerated of the differences that characterize the NEC, in our view, but this issue causes greater tension below top leadership levels. A few black NEC members resent the nonblacks on the committee because of their disproportionate influence

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and pro-Moscow tilt; however, nonblack NEC membership is generally accepted. In fact, the NEC was expanded in 1985 partly to broaden its racial composition to include a white, Indians, and Coloreds, all of whom had been in the ANC since the 1960s. In lower ANC leadership levels and among the rank and file, however, there is a pronounced tendency toward black exclusivity.

Ethnic differences among blacks have been more divisive for the organization over the last few years than those among racial groups. Although several black ethnic groups are represented on the NEC, the Xhosas, who live primarily in the eastern part of South Africa's Cape Province and are more than five million strong, have dominated the ANC for almost 40 years and have formed the backbone of the military wing since its creation in 1961. Although ANC leaders publicly deny it

black ethnic rivalries occasionally surface. Moreover, the Zulus, who number almost seven million and are South Africa's largest black ethnic group, historically dislike Xhosa supremacy and, with only three members on the NEC, probably consider themselves underrepresented.

The ANC has tried to deal with racial tensions—albeit with questionable success at the rank-and-file level—by emphasizing the “Africanness” of South Africa's whites and by repeatedly declaring that its struggle is not with whites per se but with an intractable “apartheid government.” Ethnic factionalism has been handled by emphasizing to new recruits the ANC's commitment to ethnic diversity and, in a more substantive way, by broadening the leadership to include more representatives from non-Xhosa ethnic groups. For example, three of the six blacks who joined the NEC in 1985 are non-Xhosa.

Mechanics of Unity

The ANC has also maintained unity by making consensus the centerpiece of its decisionmaking process.

most major ANC decisions are the product of group debate and incorporate the views of

the various elements that compose the organization. The process allows the leadership to balance policy-making by permitting different factions to take the lead on individual issues.

An examination of ANC decisions reveals that the consensus tool has some drawbacks, affecting both the pace and quality of its decisionmaking.

the process often delays responses to fast-breaking developments. For example, the ANC's failure to respond to a 1986 British Commonwealth offer to facilitate negotiations with Pretoria apparently gave the government extra time to change its mind about the initiative and later to blame the ANC for its failure. Moreover, the necessity for consensus has blunted the ANC's ability to adopt bold initiatives, primarily because it has been easier to agree internally on responses to Pretoria's moves than on new strategies of its own. As a result, ANC policies generally are reactive rather than innovative.

Despite these drawbacks, the consensus system has worked remarkably well for the ANC, in our view. By adopting a decisionmaking style that facilitates cooperation among divisive groups, the ANC has been able to deal successfully with unprecedented domestic and international pressures in recent years that, if unmet, might have compromised its position as the preeminent representative of South Africa's blacks. Moreover, the policymaking process has permitted the ANC to deal confidently with issues and developments on which it has reached agreement and also has given it some immunity from attempts to exploit its divisions.

Domestic Challenges: Dealing With a Radicalized Constituency

The dramatic changes that have occurred since 1984 have significantly altered the way the ANC operates and relates to its constituency inside South Africa.

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Caught offguard by the widespread unrest and heightened political awareness of blacks, it has reevaluated and revised its tactics to suit new realities. These changes have ranged from adjusting military tactics to establishing sound relations with new internal black groups to courting South African whites.

Evolution of Military Policy

The pressures for change prompted ANC officials to call a conference in Zambia in mid-1985.

ANC leaders have reduced their criticism of attacks on soft targets, such as shopping malls and supermarkets, that are often the work of township militants or poorly disciplined members, even though such attacks are not approved operations.

The new military policy is, in our view, still ambiguous, and the organization remains reluctant to endorse a premeditated campaign against white civilians. ANC rhetoric generally remains more radical than its

actions. For example, although the range of acceptable targets now includes white farmers who monitor ANC infiltrations on behalf of the government, and even urban white males considered eligible for military service, available evidence does not show a marked increase in attacks against them. In fact, landmines placed on rural roads and bombings in urban areas have resulted in far greater nonwhite casualties. ANC propaganda still contains provocative calls to "bring the struggle into white areas," but official pronouncements appear to be carefully worded to avoid arousing white concerns.

Ties to the Internal Opposition

Relations With Political Groups. The expansion of domestic opposition groups over the past few years has tasked the ANC's ability to affect developments in South Africa's black community. Although Pretoria claims that internal black groups are merely front organizations for the ANC, we believe the relationship between the ANC and internal organizations—specifically the multiracial United Democratic Front (UDF)—is far more complex.

Although ANC leaders probably accepted that they could not compete with the access these groups had to blacks, the ANC appeared reluctant to let internal leaders make independent decisions on strategy. At the same time, the ANC appeared to have no qualms about using the ready-made grassroots network of an organization like the UDF to mobilize protests and possibly even to recruit for its military wing. These policies, however, have had the unintended effect of reinforcing Pretoria's stereotype of the UDF as an ANC stalking horse and have risked alienating some elements of the black opposition. Pretoria cited ANC statements supporting antiapartheid groups as evidence of complicity between the internal black opposition and the insurgent group to justify the restriction in February 1988 of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) of 17 black opposition groups, including the UDF.



Figure 4. Cartoonist's interpretation of the political situation in South Africa. (The UDF, COSATU, and SAYCO are leading antiapartheid organizations.)

Over time the ANC has changed its policies and adopted a more cooperative attitude that reflects both its growing respect for the capabilities of the internal opposition and its understanding of the constraints under which it operates. As a result, we believe that the ANC and the internal opposition today constitute a more equal coalition of forces, although numerous US Embassy reports indicate that most blacks do not challenge the ANC's singular popular appeal.

ANC leaders today continue to meet with their UDF counterparts outside South Africa to discuss general goals and strategies, but the exiled group no longer insists that internal activities be coordinated in detail. The ANC reportedly offers advice to the internal groups on the kinds of protests that would be mutually beneficial, but it also seeks guidance from groups inside South Africa.

The ANC has learned the value of adopting a less patronizing attitude toward the internal black opposition and tries to establish links to new groups as they emerge that

Relations With Labor. As part of its campaign to improve ties to internal black organizations, the ANC has also courted the black labor movement, particularly the 750,000-member Congress of South African Trade Unions. Since its establishment in 1985, COSATU's reservoir of political power has presented the ANC with new challenges.

they have drawn COSATU into a cooperative arrangement, indicating that they recognize that COSATU—because of its ability to deliver on bread-and-butter issues—has far more direct influence over South Africa's black work force. SACTU appears to have found a niche in serving in a liaison capacity.

ANC, SACTU, and COSATU leaders meet regularly to discuss strategy and policies and to coordinate activities.

COSATU, in turn, has identified itself publicly with ANC goals. The outcome of COSATU's 1987 national conference underscored the group's commitment to the ANC. The labor federation vowed to remain in the forefront of political activity in South Africa; officially adopted the ANC's agenda as embodied in the Freedom Charter; and, like the ANC, called for comprehensive economic sanctions and disinvestment.

Despite the strong links and frequent contacts between the ANC and COSATU, their relationship probably will remain complicated. COSATU is worried about ANC encroachment, and we believe COSATU is determined to maintain a safe distance between itself and the ANC, regardless of its support for ANC positions. Relations with the ANC also have caused friction within COSATU between those members who favor greater political activism and those who argue that the federation should devote its time to labor issues and industrial problems. [REDACTED]

The ANC's decision to recognize COSATU's preeminence in the black labor movement has not stopped the ANC from seeking independent contacts with black workers, another tactic that could sour relations between the two groups. The ANC continues to try to cultivate relations with the leaders of individual COSATU affiliates. [REDACTED]

wooing Whites

In addition to pursuing contacts with the internal black opposition, the ANC also has sought to improve its relations with South African whites. In response to ANC overtures, groups of whites ignored South African Government warnings and traveled to Lusaka to meet openly with ANC leaders in both 1985 and 1986. [REDACTED]

that meeting, both the ANC and the predominantly Afrikaner delegation unanimously supported a negotiated solution to the South African dilemma. [REDACTED]

Despite the ANC's interest in attracting white support, the leadership apparently is reluctant to embrace some of the moderate policies advanced by white



Figure 5. ANC official Thabo Mbeki and prominent Afrikaner liberal Frederik van der Sluis in 1987 in Dakar. The New York Times ©

groups, particularly the renunciation of violence—probably out of concern that such a move might erode black support for the organization. The leadership has, however, made a special effort in its statements and actions to allay misgivings about the ANC and its campaign to end minority rule. In official communications, for example, the ANC consistently states that whites have an important role to play in postapartheid South Africa and that the ANC is fighting the “apartheid regime,” not whites. [REDACTED]

Although ANC overtures have attracted a small but growing number of well-known whites who are disaffected with the Botha government, they have not convinced the average white South African—whose primary concern is security—that the government should talk to the ANC. Polls indicate that even whites considered liberal by white South African standards adopt a distinctly more conservative line when the ANC is the issue. This white attitude came through clearly in the May 1987 election when whites voted overwhelmingly for candidates who called for action against “terrorists.” Although ANC leaders were sobered by the election results, we believe they continue to view improved relations with whites as an important part of their overall political strategy aimed at creating a broad, multiracial coalition that would pressure Pretoria to negotiate. [REDACTED]

Foreign Pressures: Reaching Out to the International Community

Pursuing Western Contacts

The surge in Western interest in South Africa in recent years offered the ANC an unparalleled opportunity to diversify its foreign contacts beyond the Soviet Bloc.

Although the ANC historically had enjoyed good relations with several Nordic countries, its official contacts with other Western governments had been limited.

Since embarking on its campaign in the West, the ANC has solicited financial aid from non-Communist sources, but its primary objective has been more than "tin-cup diplomacy." Citing human rights issues and democratic principles, the ANC has pressed Western governments to adopt policies—particularly mandatory, comprehensive economic sanctions—that would further isolate Pretoria. ANC leaders have increased the frequency and duration of their visits to the West. Tambo has been particularly active, talking with the Prime Ministers of New Zealand, Australia, and Japan, as well as the US Secretary of State and the UK Foreign Minister, over the last two years.

Recently, however, the ANC has suffered some diplomatic disappointments. At the Commonwealth Summit in late 1987, British Prime Minister Thatcher rejected further economic sanctions against South Africa and described the ANC as a terrorist organization. Moreover, several other Western governments—including those of the United States and Australia—have been pressing the ANC to clarify its postapartheid agenda and to denounce acts of violence. The ANC resents these demands and publicly accuses Western leaders of setting higher standards for its conduct than for Pretoria's. Despite rhetoric and recent setbacks, the ANC has so far refrained from




Figure 6. ANC President Oliver Tambo meeting Secretary of State Shultz in Washington last year.

West Africa ©

adopting policies that would punish Western governments and/or corporations that deal with the Botha regime.

despite some miscues, the ANC is showing increasing political acumen in its dealings with Western capitals. Tambo's recent condemnation of necklacing, for example, was, in our view, clearly aimed at Western audiences. Moreover,

We expect the ANC's campaign for stiffer sanctions to intensify in the next year in response to Pretoria's February crackdown on internal opponents.

Maintaining Old Ties

In our view, the ANC's courting of the West has not diminished the importance of its ties to the Soviet Union. Moscow, in fact, has backed ANC overtures to the West in conjunction with its current support for a political solution to the South African problem. Soviet support for ANC diplomatic initiatives is probably contingent on the West gaining no significant influence over the direction of ANC policy and not undermining the ANC/SACP alliance. The Soviets also have accepted ANC solicitation of Western humanitarian and economic assistance and have urged the ANC to use its Western contacts to promote the "liberation" struggle.

In Africa, ANC leaders have sought to improve access to the Frontline States¹ so as to improve their military effectiveness, but to date they have had little success. Most southern African leaders are politically committed to the ANC's goals but stop short of aiding and abetting its military activities because of the threat of South African military retaliation. In particular, no country bordering South Africa permits ANC military bases on its territory. Frontline leaders are generally supportive of the ANC's attempt to improve relations with the West and share the ANC's conviction that Western diplomatic and economic pressure on South Africa needs to be intensified.

Outlook and Implications

We believe that the ANC will maintain its position as leader of the antiapartheid struggle over the next several years. Its experience with consensus decision-making and its successful accommodation of various

¹ Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Tanzania, and Mozambique. ANC facilities in these states range from offices and clandestine facilities in countries such as Zimbabwe to military camps in Angola.



Figure 7. Tambo and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Safeco ©

ideological, generational, and ethnic strains will enable it to handle organizational pressures, in our view. The preservation of unity, however, will probably necessitate further broadening of the leadership to quiet organizational rivalries. SACP influence will remain strong, in our judgment, not only because of the need for Soviet aid but also because the ANC and SACP realize they need each other to attain their mutual goal of black majority rule in South Africa.

The ANC will continue to adjust its policies to changing circumstances in South Africa, but we do not expect a dramatic shift in tactics. The ANC is likely to maintain close relations with the internal black opposition and labor unions. The new crackdown probably will prompt internal groups to seek ANC advice on operating underground in order to continue opposition activities. The ANC will also continue to court whites, but we do not believe that it will make accommodations, such as renouncing violence, that would endanger the support of blacks.

The question of killing white civilians will remain the most controversial topic on the ANC policy agenda. Pretoria's recent actions probably have discredited black leaders who attempted to rein in militant youth and have reinforced perceptions that whites will never

voluntarily give up power. These realizations may prompt many black youths to leave the country to join the ANC's military wing in exile. These potential new recruits, who have received their political baptism of fire in a violent environment, probably will urge the ANC to carry out more attacks against white civilians. We believe ANC leaders will remain reluctant to endorse such a campaign. We cannot rule out, however, that the ANC leadership may respond to even greater government repression by granting the military wing more latitude in choosing targets. Furthermore, operational constraints—communications and logistic problems—will preclude tight control of ANC members and township militants. We foresee a continued slow increase in white civilian casualties as a result. [REDACTED]

The ANC is likely to continue to pursue its two-track policy of maintaining close ties to Bloc countries while expanding contacts in the West. It will do this because it needs Bloc aid, on the one hand, and because it is convinced that Western pressure is critical to breaking Pretoria's will, on the other. The Soviet focus on political, rather than only military, means as a way to change the governing system almost certainly will encourage the ANC to continue its Western campaign. However, the ANC's courting of the West inevitably will stop short of action that would threaten organizational unity—such as purging a significant number of Communists—or that would erode its position as the premier representative of the black majority—such as unilaterally forswearing violence. [REDACTED]

ANC cohesiveness will make it difficult for outside parties—[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to take advantage of fissures within the organization to press for changes in policies or attitudes. Indeed, the ANC's concern that other parties may try to divide the group will probably harden its commitment to cohesion and consensus. Moreover, the characteristic cautiousness of the ANC also suggests that the organization will not propose novel solutions to the South African problem and that its response time to fast-breaking events, including political initiatives that may be launched by Washington or Pretoria, will remain agonizingly slow. [REDACTED]

The West's relations with the ANC probably will also remain difficult because of the group's penchant for fiery rhetoric and ill-considered statements. Despite their focus on international matters in recent years, ANC leaders still are not expert diplomats. In addition, the ANC believes that the West bears part of the blame for the continuation of the apartheid system, and it is unlikely to abandon criticism of Western governments. [REDACTED]

Alternative Scenarios

The Potential for Disunity

Despite the ANC's remarkable cohesion to date, extraordinary events could exacerbate underlying tensions and bring the organization to a breaking point. [REDACTED]

The Release of Nelson Mandela From Prison. The possibility of a power struggle exists if the ANC does not afford Mandela a leadership post consistent with his ambition and his domestic and international standing. Public opinion polls show that Mandela is the country's most popular and influential black political figure; [REDACTED]

A Significant Increase in Ethnic Conflict Among South African Blacks. Although the ANC has been adept at managing ethnic differences within the group, these differences could be exacerbated by significant ethnic conflict among South African

blacks—occasioned, for example, by a decision by Chief Buthelezi and his Zulu supporters to negotiate with the government. Persistent, violent clashes between rival black ethnic groups—such as the Xhosas and the Zulus—could lead to splits among black organizations that could reverberate in the ANC.

The Collapse of the White Government. Probably the greatest threat to ANC unity would be success in its goal of overthrowing the white government. A transfer of power in South Africa to the ANC would severely test the organization's cohesion because the ANC's various factions have conflicting plans for the postapartheid era. ANC Communists and non-Communists could be at odds, for example, over the direction of foreign policy and the creation of a new economic order. Tensions between them, coupled with black ethnic rivalries, would create unprecedented strains in the organization. Tambo, perhaps acknowledging the likelihood of serious disagreements down the road, has publicly said that the SACP would have to fend for itself in a majority-ruled South Africa.

Possible Dramatic Shifts in ANC Policy


Although marked shifts in ANC policy are highly unlikely, we believe that they could occur in response to dramatic developments during the next two to three years:

- *The ANC and South African blacks embrace a militant antiwhite ideology and advocate terrorist attacks on all white civilians, including children.* Because the ANC has reacted to increasing government repression and black casualties in recent years

without substantially changing its military tactics, we do not believe the group would choose a radical military policy solely in response to government repression. Extreme internal repression coupled with internal or external threats to ANC prestige, however, could lead the group to advocate an antiwhite terrorist campaign. For example, if the ANC's leadership of the antiapartheid movement were challenged by a radical black group advocating wholesale attacks against whites, the ANC might try to regain its predominant position by endorsing a militant antiwhite policy.

- *The ANC agrees to abandon previous preconditions and enters into negotiations with the South African Government.* We do not envision such a policy change unless the ANC's position as the predominant leader of the antiapartheid movement were to be significantly undercut by internal black opposition groups, such as the UDF and COSATU, and unless those groups subsequently entered into credible power-sharing negotiations with Pretoria on behalf of South African blacks. The ANC, fearing that it would be left out of a new political settlement, might then decide to compromise by abandoning its preconditions for negotiations. Even then, however, such a move would be hotly debated in ANC councils, and some militants would continue to argue against any compromise.

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


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
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
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
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


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


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Appendix B

The National Executive Committee

